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Incentive contracts for gatekeepers who control patient access to specialist medical services 
provide too weak incentives to investigate cost further when expected cost of treatment is 
greater than benefit. Making gatekeepers residual claimants with a fixed fee from which treat-
ment costs must be met (as with full insurers who are themselves gatekeepers) provides too 
strong incentives when expected cost is less than benefit. Giving patients the choice between 
a gatekeeper with an incentive contract and one without is unstable. With one scenario, pa- 
tients always prefer the latter. With another, patients have incentives to acquire information 
that makes incentive contracts ineffective. 
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An important role in many health services is that of a gatekeeper who controls patients’ access
to specialist medical services. This paper is concerned with the contractual basis under which
gatekeepers operate. The need for a gatekeeper arises when patients pay below market prices
for services at the time they use them, either because they have private insurance or because the
services are publicly funded. Without a gatekeeper, insured patients will make use of specialist
services up to the point at which the marginal bene￿t to them equals the marginal cost to them.
If the marginal cost is below the market price, specialist services are overused. But will a
gatekeeper actually ensure that specialist medical services are used when appropriate? And
how does that depend on the contractual basis under which gatekeepers operate?
Private medical insurance in the US has not traditionally used gatekeepers￿patients could
themselves choose when and where to make use of specialist services. But many managed
care plans use gatekeeper arrangements, either by requiring a referral from a speci￿ed primary
care physician before consulting a specialist (Glied (2000)) or by fully insuring provision only
if it is supplied, or authorised, by the responsible health maintenance organisation (HMO).
In the publicly-funded British National Health Service (NHS), the gatekeeper role is ￿lled
by a general practitioner (GP), see Scott (2000). To receive non-emergency specialist care, a
patient has to be referred by a GP. Many private medical insurers in Britain also require this. A
gatekeeping physician may provide valuable information to patients about specialist services
but it is the control of access to services that makes the physician a gatekeeper.
An HMO that itself both carries out the gatekeeper role and provides full insurance pays
for the cost of specialist treatment and thus retains cost savings from not referring a patient, or
from referring the patient for a less expensive specialist service. This contractual arrangement
is referred to here as a paying gatekeeper. There has been concern in the US that managed care
plans have been too much concerned with saving money and too little with patient welfare. See
CutlerandZeckhauser(2000, pp.629-631)andGlied(2000, pp.739-740)fordiscussionsofthe
empirical evidence. In the British NHS, there has been some experimentation with contractual
arrangements for gatekeepers. In the traditional arrangement a GP receives a capitation fee
for each patient on her list but does not pay for specialist services￿the costs of these are
met by the health authority. Concern that GPs did not take suf￿cient account of these costs
led to the introduction in 1991 of arrangements under which GPs could become fundholders.
Fundholding GPs were allocated a budget out of which they were expected to meet the costs
of many of the specialist services for which they referred patients. For those services, they
were thus paying gatekeepers. Concern about the working of the fundholding system led to its
abolition in April 1999. See Glennerster, Matsaganis, Owens and Hancock (1993) for more
details on fundholding and an evaluation from a social policy perspective.
Having gatekeepers bear the full cost of specialist medical treatment is not the only way
to make them more cost conscious. Any incentive contract with reward decreasing in the cost
of specialist treatment gives a gatekeeper a reason to ￿nd out more about cost. There would
1seem to be two potential ways in which this may improve services: (1) of those patients who
would otherwise have been referred, some may be referred at a lower cost while others are not
referred because the cost is found to exceed the bene￿t, and (2) of those patients for whom
referral would not otherwise have been thought cost effective, some may be referred because
the cost is discovered to be lower. Set against any such gains must be the time, effort and
money gatekeepers incur to acquire additional information. The issues of concern in this paper
are what feasible contractual arrangements are most effective at inducing gatekeepers to put
in that time, effort and money where it is most worthwhile. Can one improve on the paying
gatekeeper arrangement by which the gatekeeper is made, in effect, residual claimant, as with
HMOs that themselves act as both gatekeepers and insurers and many of the referrals by GP
fundholders in Britain? And where patients have the choice between types of gatekeeper (as
they did in the fundholding system in Britain), will those types for whom that time, effort and
money is most worthwhile actually choose a gatekeeper with an incentive contract in preference
to one without?
The paper uses the following framework to analyse these issues. Patients differ in the cost
of, and bene￿t from, specialist treatment resulting from referral. With a low level of effort, a
gatekeeper observes the expected bene￿t and receives an initial signal of cost. On the basis
of that signal, the gatekeeper can decide whether to refer the patient. With more effort, the
gatekeeper may ￿nd out more information about cost and so make a better-informed judgement
about whether referral is worthwhile. A gatekeeper who retains some of the cost savings has
more incentive to incur that effort.
A number of messages come across from the analysis. It is important to distinguish between
medical conditions for which the gatekeeper observes a cost signal before deciding how much
to investigate from those for which the gatekeeper observes a cost signal only after deciding
how much to investigate. In the former case, giving a gatekeeper a reward that decreases with
cost never realises gains of the type identi￿ed in (2) above. As for the potential gains identi￿ed
in (1) above, a paying gatekeeper has too strong incentives to carry out further investigations, in
the sense that such investigations are carried out for more patient types than is socially ef￿cient.
As a result, fewer patient types are referred than would be the case with ef￿cient incentives.
This contrasts with other agency problems in which making the agent residual claimant for
costs ensures ef￿cient decisions. The reason for the difference is that here referral decisions
affect bene￿t as well as cost and the gatekeeper is not residual claimant for bene￿t. As long
as the cost of specialist treatment can be monitored effectively even if bene￿t cannot, one
can improve on the contractual arrangement by which the gatekeeper pays the cost, though
it is not always possible to induce fully ef￿cient decisions. This result has implications for
the contractual arrangements for gatekeepers. It also has implications for the organisation of
private health insurance. More ef￿cient than having an HMO itself act as both gatekeeper and
insurer is for insurance to be provided by a third party insurer who employs the gatekeeper
on a contractual basis that does not make the gatekeeper residual claimant. There is also a
further message for the organisation of health services. Patients who have a choice between
2a gatekeeper with an incentive contract and one without when they seek a referral will never
prefer the former. Introducing patient choice between a fundholding and a non-fundholding
GP, as in the British NHS, is not a sensible organisational structure.
The messages that come across are somewhat different in the case of medical conditions
for which the gatekeeper observes a cost signal only after deciding how much investigation to
do. In contrast to the previous case, there may then be gains of the type identi￿ed in (2) above
from giving a gatekeeper incentives. Also in contrast to the previous case, patients may prefer
to consult a gatekeeper with an incentive contract to one without. They are more likely to be
referred by a gatekeeper without an incentive contract if the cost signal indicates an expected
cost less than bene￿t and by a gatekeeper with an incentive contract if that signal indicates an
expected cost greater than bene￿t. There is thus a premium to patients who ￿nd out more about
the costs likely to arise from referral in their case before choosing between different gatekeeper
arrangements (that is, before choosing their type of managed care plan or GP). But, if patients
become too well informed, adverse selection becomes so serious that even gatekeepers with
incentive contracts lose all incentive to incur additional effort and cease to behave differently
from those without incentive contracts. In this case too, therefore, the model predicts that
coexistence of the two arrangements is unstable when patients can become informed. For
testing that prediction empirically, it is unfortunate that fundholding in the British NHS was
abolished too soon to ￿nd out whether the prediction is correct.
The model used here is a form of principal-agent model with both selection among types
unknown to the principal (because patient costs and bene￿ts are not observed by the insurer or
health authority) and moral hazard (arising from unveri￿able gatekeeper effort). It differs from
the standard procurement model with unknown types and unveri￿able effort (see, for example,
Laffont and Tirole (1993, Ch.1)) in that there the principal is trading off lower information
rent to the agent against sub-optimal agent effort to reduce cost when the agent knows the
type before the contract is set and cost is veri￿able ex post. If there is selection between
types, procurement occurs for an interval of lowest cost types. In contrast, here information
rents are not an issue because the agent does not know a patient’s type before the contract
is set. Instead the principal wishes the agent (the gatekeeper) to select between types on the
difference between bene￿t and cost, with cost but not bene￿t veri￿able ex post. In the literature
on contracts speci￿cally for health care, much of the concern has been with ensuring that all
types of patient are treated, with an optimal trade-off between quality and cost, so there is no
selection. See Chalkley and Malcomson (2000) for a survey. An exception is Ma and Riordan
(2002, Section 6), in which physicians select on the basis of bene￿t. There, however, the
cost of treatment is known and the same for all patient types, so there is no role for physician
effort to ￿nd out about cost and no moral hazard. The physician’s only role is to in￿uence the
cutoff bene￿t above which a patient is treated, which greatly simpli￿es the problem of inducing
ef￿cientselection. Moreover, theonlyincentivecontractsconsideredforthephysicianarethose
with a ￿xed charge for agreeing to the patient receiving treatment.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section sets out the model used for the analysis.
3Section 3 considers the case in which a gatekeeper receives the cost signal before deciding
whether to investigate further and can, therefore, condition that decision on the signal, Section
4 the case in which a gatekeeper has to decide how much to ￿nd out about the cost before
receiving a cost signal. Section 5 discusses empirical evidence relating to, and some practical
implications of, the model. Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
2 The model
Patients seeking specialist treatment must visit a gatekeeper physician who decides whether to
refer them. Patients are of different types, each characterised by a bene￿t from referral b known




, with 0 < b ￿ N b, and a cost of treatment resulting from




, with 0 < c < N b < N c.
Bene￿t is measured net of any disutility of treatment experienced by the patient. Patient types
are distributed in the population according to the commonly known joint distribution H.c;b/,
with associated density function h.c;b/. A patient’s type is unknown to the gatekeeper before
agreeing to take on the patient. To avoid cream skimming (declining to take on more costly
patients) of the kind discussed by Newhouse (1989) for the US and Matsaganis and Glennerster
(1994) for the UK, payments would need to be conditioned on characteristics observed by the
gatekeeper at that stage. Cream skimming is a potentially important issue but not the concern
of the present paper.
Patients do not pay directly for the services of either the gatekeeper or the specialist. They
are fully insured by either a private insurer or a publicly-funded health authority. To allow for
the deadweight loss of raising public funds by taxation, it is convenient to adopt the convention
that the cost c includes a premium ￿ ￿ 0 to account for that loss. The actual monetary payment
for the specialist services is thus c=.1 C ￿/.
With loss of reservation utility U, a gatekeeper visited by a patient observes the patient’s




that provides information about the
patient’s cost of treatment resulting from referral.1 Uncertainty about cost given this signal may
arise from uncertainty either about the cost of a particular medical intervention (because, for
example, of the possibility of complications) or about which medical intervention the specialist
will select. One interpretation of s is as the set of ￿presenting symptoms￿ readily apparent
to any physician who examines the patient. An example might be severe abdominal pain. If
the patient is referred on the basis of this information alone, the treatment cost resulting from
the referral will depend on what the specialist determines to be the cause. This is captured
1The bene￿t b relevant to the present analysis is the gatekeeper’s assessment of it after eliciting information
from the patient about, for example, how much pain the medical condition causes. How to elicit such information
is a concern of any gatekeeper, whether or not having an incentive contract, and so is not analysed here. The
results that follow continue to hold when the gatekeeper receives only a signal of expected bene￿t if, conditional
on that signal and the signal s, actual bene￿t is uncorrelated with actual cost. (This does not, of course, imply that
bene￿t is uncorrelated with cost ex ante￿only that knowing cost provides no information about bene￿t additional
to that provided by the signal.) Allowing for this complicates the exposition without adding further insights. Some
amendments are required in other cases.
4by the following speci￿cation. For a given patient type .c;b/, the signal s has commonly
known probability density function g.sIc;b/. More convenient than using the conventional




g.sIc;b/ds; for X ￿ S: (1)
Thisfunctionspeci￿estheprobabilitythats liesintheset X forgiven.c;b/. Itisthesameasthe
conventional distribution function for s D s0 when X D
￿
s;s0￿
. The gatekeeper’s probability







Let F.cIs;b/ denote the associated distribution function and c.s;b/ D E fc j s;bg the mean
cost conditional on .s;b/. This paper is concerned with medical conditions for which the
probability distributions have the property that the upper support of f .cIs;b/ exceeds b given
s. Thus, given any signal s, there is always positive probability that the actual cost resulting
from referral exceeds the bene￿t. For any .s;b/ for which this is not the case, referral is always
ef￿cient.
By incurring utility loss e > 0, the gatekeeper may learn more about cost before deciding
whether to refer the patient. Speci￿cally, the gatekeeper learns thetrue cost c with probability ￿
(0 < ￿ < 1) but nothing more than s with probability 1￿￿.2 The gatekeeper is risk neutral, so
e can be interpreted as either monetary cost or disutility of another kind. It might, for example,
correspond to the time taken to give the patient a thorough examination or to the cost of supplies
used to carry out tests in the of￿ce. Here it is referred to simply as effort. The gatekeeper
receives no direct utility or disutility from referring the patient given the information available
but, if operating under an incentive contract, the decision may have ￿nancial consequences.
Within this framework, two different scenarios are analysed.
Assumption 1 The gatekeeper observes the cost signal s and bene￿t b before deciding whether
to incur effort e.
Assumption 2 The gatekeeper must decide whether to incur effort e without ￿rst observing the
cost signal s and bene￿t b. The gatekeeper learns b and either s or c.
Assumption 1 is appropriate when, as with many medical services, investigations are se-
quential. Assumption 2 is appropriate when there is a choice between two investigations that
are either mutually exclusive or such that it is never worthwhile to carry out both. It is also
appropriate when ￿effort￿ corresponds to buying equipment or setting up procedures before the
patient visits the gatekeeper.
The information structure in the model is as follows:




continuously variable and the probability ￿.e/ of discovering
the true cost an increasing function of e. Some implications of this extension are mentioned below.
51. whether a patient has visited the gatekeeper and, if referred, the cost of treatment c are
veri￿able at no cost;
2. the bene￿t b and the signal s are observed by both the gatekeeper and the patient but are
not veri￿able;
3. whether the additional effort e is incurred and the cost c, if learnt in advance of the
referral decision, are observed only by the gatekeeper but the gatekeeper can choose to
credibly reveal c if learnt.
In the present context, it is natural that the patient is better informed about the bene￿t b and
the signal s than about whether the gatekeeper has discovered the actual cost c. The patient
will, for example, have some idea what it would feel like to be made well again and will be
aware of the symptoms that induced a visit to the gatekeeper in the ￿rst place. In contrast,
a patient presenting with, to use the previous example, severe abdominal pain is unlikely to
know whether the physician has located a tumour unless the physician reveals this. Locating a
tumour will reveal information about the cost of treatment c, for example, the need for a speci￿c
surgical procedure. Moreover, once located, it is likely to be relatively straightforward for the
gatekeeper to demonstrate the presence of the tumour to another physician, which motivates
the speci￿cation that information discovered as a result of the effort e can be credibly revealed
if the gatekeeper wishes. The speci￿cation that the patient observes b and s perfectly, but not
whether the gatekeeper learns c, serves to bring out this difference between b and s on the one
hand and c on the other.3
A patient can limit adverse gatekeeper decisions by requesting a second opinion from an-
other physician in the way standard in medical practice. That physician, also with utility loss
U, observes the same bene￿t b and signal s as the gatekeeper, and can verify c if the gatekeeper
has learnt this before making the referral decision and chooses to reveal it. If paid a ￿xed fee
of U, she has no incentive to report other than truthfully, given the information available to her,
on whether referral is warranted.4
Proposition 1 Suppose a second opinion is at the payer’s expense. Suppose also the gate-
keeper’s contract is such that a second opinion con￿rming the gatekeeper’s referral decision
leaves the gatekeeper’s payoff unaffected but one overturning the gatekeeper’s referral decision
3If instead the patient observed only noisy signals of b and s, the second opinion mechanism to be discussed
shortly as a way for the patient to limit adverse gatekeeper decisions would result in second opinions sometimes
actually being sought.
4In principle, the payer could require a second opinion in every case, use this to verify b and s, and thus make
payment to the gatekeeper conditional on b and s. It is assumed here that U is too large to make this worthwhile
and that the maximum penalty that can be imposed on the gatekeeper is too small to make random checks cost
effective. It is also assumed that it is too costly to be worthwhile setting up any mechanism that both induces
the patient and the gatekeeper to reveal their common observations directly and does not undermine the purpose
of providing the patient with health insurance in the ￿rst place. For example, permitting the patient to bribe the
gatekeeper to agree to referral (which the patient would be willing to do up to the amount b) and requiring the
gatekeeper to pay all the costs resulting from referral would ensure that the gatekeeper receives the full social
bene￿t of her decision. It would, however, leave the patient in the position of being effectively uninsured.
6results in a payoff to the gatekeeper strictly lower than if the gatekeeper had made the opposite
decision. Then no second opinion is sought and:
1. underAssumption1: ifb ￿ c.s;b/, thegatekeeperrefersthepatientunlessshehaslearnt
c and c > b; if b < c.s;b/, the gatekeeper makes referral decisions unconstrained by
the possibility of a second opinion;
2. under Assumption 2: if s is learnt and b ￿ c.s;b/ or if c is learnt and b ￿ c, the
gatekeeper refers the patient; if s is learnt and b < c.s;b/ or if c is learnt and b < c, the
gatekeeper makes referral decisions unconstrained by the possibility of a second opinion.
Proof. Assumption 1. Suppose b ￿ c.s;b/. Since the patient observes b and s, he will re-
quest a second opinion (which will overturn the gatekeeper’s decision) unless referred or unless
the gatekeeper reveals c and c > b. Having the decision overturned reduces the gatekeeper’s
payoff, so the gatekeeper will refer the patient unless she has learnt c and c > b. In neither case
can the patient gain by requesting a second opinion. Suppose now b < c.s;b/. A second opin-
ion will result in the patient not being referred unless the gatekeeper has learnt c and chooses
to reveal it. The gatekeeper thus receives no penalty from refusing referral. If the gatekeeper
refers the patient, the patient will not ask for a second opinion because this will result in non-
referral and b > 0. So the gatekeeper is unconstrained by the possibility of a second opinion.
Again, the patient does not gain by requesting one.
Assumption 2. Under Assumption 2, either s or c is learnt but not both. If s is learnt, the
same argument applies as for Assumption 1 except that there is no possibility that c is also
learnt. If c is learnt, the patient will request a second opinion unless referred or unless the
gatekeeper reveals c and c > b. Since in this case the gatekeeper has not learnt s, she will have
to reveal c to justify non-referral. If b ￿ c, the second opinion will overturn a decision not to
refer, reducing the gatekeeper’s payoff, so the gatekeeper will refer the patient and the patient
will not request a second opinion. If b < c, the same argument applies as for Assumption 1
when b < c.s;b/.
In the absence of a second opinion, the only veri￿able information is whether a patient visits
thegatekeeperand, ifthepatientisreferred, thecostofthetreatmentresultingfromthatreferral.
A contract for payment to the gatekeeper can therefore be denoted by a payment P0 for a patient




for a patient referred





by Proposition 1, the gatekeeper can be induced not to refer a patient for whom b < c.s;b/,
or b < c if c is learnt before the referral decision, because it is straightforward to ensure that
the gatekeeper’s contract satis￿es the other contract conditions speci￿ed there. A gatekeeper




. Because a second opinion is never
sought, it imposes no costs on the payer. Thus giving the patient the right to seek a second
opinion at the payer’s expense is a costless mechanism for ensuring that referrals are made if
and only if the bene￿t exceeds the expected social cost given the information available to the
7gatekeeper. For a public sector payer it is ef￿cient. For a private insurer, competition in the
insurance market will ensure that it, or some equally costless and effective mechanism, is part
of the insurance contract with the patient.5
One incentive contract is a ￿xed fee paid to the gatekeeper whether or not the patient is
referred, with the gatekeeper paying the cost of specialist treatment. This is the paying gate-
keeper arrangement discussed in the Introduction. In that case, the net reward to the gatekeeper
for a patient referred with cost c is P.c/ given by





where P0 is the ￿xed fee. (Recall that c is the social cost of treatment resulting from referral
and that the gatekeeper incurs only the private cost c=.1 C ￿/.) For an HMO that both provides
full insurance and acts as gatekeeper, the net reward is also given by (3) with P0 the insurance
premium. (In this case, there is no deadweight loss from taxation, so ￿ D 0/. To achieve a net
reward function other than (3) with full private insurance, the gatekeeper needs to be indepen-
dent of the insurer. Thus, the choice of reward function has implications for the organisation of
private health insurance.





receives payment P0 whether or not a patient is referred. Such a gatekeeper has no incentive to
incur effort e under either Assumption 1 or Assumption 2 and makes referral decisions on the
basis of the information .s;b/. In view of Proposition 1, she therefore refers patients for whom
the bene￿t of treatment b is no less than the expected cost c.s;b/ given the information .s;b/,
that is patients with s 2 S.b/ de￿ned by
S.b/ D fs j c.s;b/ ￿ bg: (4)
She does not refer patients for whom the bene￿t is less than the expected cost, those with
s = 2 S.b/. These referral rules are ef￿cient conditional on effort e not being incurred. For such
a gatekeeper to be prepared to assess patients, she must receive payment of at least the lost
reservation utility U but there is no need for her to be paid more. Thus the payer sets P0 D U.
A natural benchmark for a publicly-funded health service is the social welfare arising from
the gatekeeper’s choices. That is also a natural benchmark for a private insurer in a perfect
insurance market when committing to a gatekeeper arrangement before individuals choose their
5Ellis and McGuire (1990) and Ma and Riordan (2002) assume that health care decisions maximize a weighted
sum of patient and physician utility as the result of an (unmodelled) bargaining process. (A similar outcome occurs
when patient care directly enters physician preferences as discussed by Newhouse (1970) and Ellis and McGuire
(1986)). This alternative mechanism for limiting physician decisions adverse to the patient would, however, result
in a gatekeeper with no incentive contract always referring a patient who sought referral, so the gatekeeping would
be completely ineffective. Added to the present model, it would increase the gains from providing gatekeepers
with incentive contracts. Evidence on the effectiveness of gatekeeping is discussed in Section 5 below.





.b ￿ c/G.S.b/Ic;b/h.c;b/dcdb ￿ .1 C ￿/U; (5)
the factor .1 C ￿/ appearing because the gatekeeper must be compensated for disutility U from
public funds with premium ￿. (Recall that the cost c is de￿ned to include this premium.)
For a gatekeeper with an incentive contract, the analysis depends on whether Assumption 1
or Assumption 2 holds. The sections that follow deal with each case in turn.
3 Gatekeeper chooses effort after receiving cost signal
This section considers the behaviour of a gatekeeper with an incentive contract under Assump-
tion 1, when the gatekeeper observes the signal s and bene￿t b before deciding whether to incur
effort e. It ￿rst investigates when it is socially ef￿cient to have the gatekeeper put in this effort.
3.1 Ef￿cient effort
Under Assumption 1, the decision whether to incur e can be made with knowledge of .s;b/. If
e is not incurred, it is ef￿cient to refer a patient with s 2 S.b/ at expected cost c.s;b/. Social
welfare for given .s;b/ is then
max[0;b ￿ c.s;b/] ￿ .1 C ￿/U: (6)
If e is incurred, actual cost c is identi￿ed with probability ￿ and the patient referred if c ￿ b,
but with probability 1 ￿ ￿ no additional information is acquired and the patient is referred if













.b ￿ c/ f .cIs;b/dc ￿ max[0;b ￿ c.s;b/]
#
￿ .1 C ￿/e: (8)
It is convenient to consider separately values of s for which c.s;b/ ￿ b (that is, s 2 S.b/)
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9Because the integral in this is restricted to c ￿ b, the integral term is positive. It corresponds to
the welfare gain from not referring a patient whose expected cost of treatment given the signal
s is less than the bene￿t but whose actual cost is revealed by additional effort to be greater than
the bene￿t. That gain must, of course, be multiplied by the probability ￿ that the actual cost is
identi￿ed and have subtracted from it the social cost .1 C ￿/e of providing the extra effort. It




















Again, the integral term is positive. It corresponds to the welfare gain from referring a patient
whose expected cost of treatment given the signal s is greater than the bene￿t but whose actual
cost is revealed by extra effort to be less than the bene￿t. Again, that gain must be multiplied
by the probability ￿ that the actual cost is identi￿ed and have subtracted from it the social cost
.1 C ￿/e of providing the extra effort.
These two terms for welfare gain correspond to the two ways mentioned in the Introduction
in which making gatekeepers more cost conscious by using incentive contracts can potentially
be bene￿cial. To provide some insight about when effort e is worthwhile, consider how a
change in s affects the social welfare gain.




, a change in s from s0








in the ￿rst-order sense: (1)


































for some c < b.
Proof. From (9) and integration by parts
W.s;b/ D ￿￿
￿
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D ￿￿
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￿ .1 C ￿/e; 8s 2 S.b/:
From (11) and integration by parts
W.s;b/ D ￿
(










F.cIs;b/dc ￿ .1 C ￿/e; 8s such that c.s;b/ ￿ b:
10From these it follows directly that the change in welfare gain resulting from a change in s from






























































































































The result is intuitive. First-order stochastic dominance implies a higher expected cost of
treatment resulting from referral. It is more worthwhile incurring the higher effort if the ex-
pected cost is closer to the bene￿t because there is then a higher probability that the actual cost
is the opposite side of b from the expected cost. That applies whether the expected cost is above
or below the bene￿t. From a statistical point of view, such a conclusion is neither surprising nor
especially novel. It does, however, have useful implications for deriving a contract to induce a
gatekeeper to incur the additional effort e for patient types for which that effort is ef￿cient.
3.2 Gatekeeper decisions
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then (1) it is not optimal for a gatekeeper with




, and (2) no
patient type at the referral stage strictly prefers a gatekeeper with an incentive contract to one
without.
Proof. Suppose a gatekeeper with an incentive contract observes s for which c.s;b/ > b.
By Proposition 1, she makes the referral decision unconstrained by the possibility of a second
opinion. By not referring the patient, she receives payment P0. With P.c/ ￿ P0 for all c, it is
not possible to increase her reward by incurring effort e and doing so involves disutility. Result
(1) follows. Given result (1), a patient will be referred by neither a gatekeeper with an incentive
contract nor one without if the signal s is such that c.s;b/ > b. But a patient will certainly be
referred by a gatekeeper without an incentive contract if s is such that c.s;b/ ￿ b. Thus the
patient is never more likely to be referred by a gatekeeper with an incentive contract than by
one without and, since b > 0, never strictly prefers the former, as claimed in result (2).
11An implication of this proposition is that the second potential bene￿t of making gatekeepers
more cost-conscious discussed in the Introduction is never realised when Assumption 1 applies.
A gatekeeper with an incentive contract has no interest in ￿nding that actual cost is less than
bene￿t when expected cost is greater than bene￿t and referral is thus reasonably refused. Note
that this conclusion is independent of the incentive scheme for gatekeepers provided P.c/ ￿ P0
for all c. It is simply the result of gatekeepers being made more cost-conscious. Note also that
Proposition 3 applies to the referral stage. A privately-insured patient responsible for paying
his own premium might, at the stage of choosing an insurer, prefer one that uses a gatekeeper
with an incentive contract if that results in a lower premium.
Proposition 3 has established that gatekeepers with incentive contracts have no incentive to
￿nd out more about the cost resulting from referral for a patient with expected cost greater than
bene￿t. Now consider a patient for whom the expected cost is less than the bene￿t, one with
s 2 S.b/. If no additional information is acquired, the patient is referred. The gatekeeper’s
expected reward for such a patient is
Z c
c





If the gatekeeper incurs effort e, she discovers the actual cost c with probability ￿. If c ￿ b, she
then refers the patient and receives payment P.c/. If c > b, she does not refer the patient and
receives payment P0. With probability 1 ￿ ￿, she discovers only s, not c, from the additional
effort e and refers the patient with the expected reward in (15). In both cases, she incurs
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The intuition behind this condition is that the incentive to incur effort results from the increase
in revenue P0 ￿ P.c/ from not referring patients (those with actual cost c greater than bene￿t
b) who would have been referred had that effort not been incurred.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and a gatekeeper has an incentive contract that




. Then that patient type strictly prefers
a gatekeeper without an incentive contract.
Proof. The incentive compatibility condition (17) can be satis￿ed for s 2 S.b/ only if
f .cIs;b/ > 0 for some c > b such that P.c/ < P0. Then for patient type s there is strictly
12positive probability that a gatekeeper with an incentive contract will ￿nd c > b and, by Propo-
sition 1, not refer the patient because P.c/ < P0. But, also by Proposition 1, a patient with
s 2 S.b/ is always referred by a gatekeeper without an incentive contract.
If the payment to a gatekeeper could be conditioned on the bene￿t b, it would be straight-
forward to induce the gatekeeper to incur effort for all signals s 2 S.b/ for which it is ef￿cient
to do so. To see this, compare the incentive compatibility condition (17) with the condition
(10) that speci￿es the s 2 S.b/ for which it is ef￿cient to incur effort e. It is apparent that the
two conditions become identical if P0 ￿ P.c/ equals .c ￿ b/=.1 C ￿/ for all c. A ￿rst step to
seeing what can be achieved with b unveri￿able is the following result.








, the gatekeeper incurs effort e for s D s0 2 S.b/. Then, for








in the ￿rst-order sense for
given b, the gatekeeper also incurs effort e.







































































where the ￿rst inequality follows from integration by parts and the second from the fact that



















￿ 0, see (14). Thus, given P0 ￿ P.c/ for all c
and P0.c/ ￿ 0, the left-hand side of (17) is no smaller for s00 than for s0.
This result is essentially the standard one that an agent prefers a wealth distribution that is
stochastically dominant; with P0 ￿ P.c/ non-decreasing in c, the left-hand side of (17) does
not decrease with a shift to a distribution of c that is stochastically dominant. It has a useful
implication. Suppose every increase in s corresponds to a shift to a stochastically dominant
distribution. Then, if for given b the gatekeeper incurs effort e for s0, she also incurs effort e
for all higher s 2 S.b/. Of course, an increase in s corresponds to an increase in expected
cost, so increasing s suf￿ciently will result in c.s;b/ > b and we know from Proposition 3 that
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Figure 1: Gatekeeper effort with stochastic dominance




D b, the gatekeeper will continue
to incur that effort. This property is illustrated in Figure 1.
That property simpli￿es the problem of inducing the gatekeeper to exert effort for all
s 2 S.b/ for which it is socially ef￿cient. For increasing s corresponding to a stochastically













This is the lowest s for which it is socially ef￿cient to incur effort e, see (10). (The inequality
in (19) may be strict for s￿.b/ D s.) Proposition 2 established that, with an increase in s corre-





But we also know from Proposition 5 that, if the gatekeeper is induced to incur effort for




. Thus, incentive compatibility













(In this, ￿D￿ can be replaced by ￿￿￿ for b such that s￿.b/ D s.) Then the incentive compati-
bility condition (17) for each .s;b/ can be replaced by the single condition (20) for each b and
the following result holds.












. Then with a pay-














dx D e; (21)




















if and only if that effort is socially ef￿cient. For given P0 ￿ P.c/ for c 2
￿N b; N c
￿
that





Proof. With P.c/ ￿ P0 and P0.c/ ￿ 0 for all c, Proposition 5 implies that incentive com-
patibility is consistent with social ef￿ciency if (20) holds. If P.c/ satis￿es (21), it is immediate
that it satis￿es (20) for b D N b. It will then also satisfy (20) for all b < N b if the derivative of the
left-hand side of (20) with respect to b is zero for b ￿ N b, that is, if




















which, with x substituted for c and c for b, can be re-written as (22).



























For given P0 ￿ P.c/ for c 2
￿N b; N c
￿
chosen to satisfy (21), the second integral on the right-hand









that satis￿es (22) is equivalent








 .x/ K.x;c/dx C ￿.c/ (24)
for given functions K.x;c/ and ￿.c/. But (24) is a Volterra integral equation that is known to




, see Kolmogorov and Fomin (1975, p. 75).6
If the conditions of Proposition 6 are satis￿ed for some P0 ￿ P.c/, then P0 can always
be chosen so that the gatekeeper receives no rent from the contract because adding the same
6I am indebted to Philippe ChonØ for this observation.
15constant to P0 and P.c/ for all c leaves all the conditions in that proposition still satis￿ed but
changes the payoff of the gatekeeper which can, therefore, be reduced to the reservation level.
Then, even if ￿ > 0, the outcome for s 2 S.b/ is ef￿cient. (It is not necessarily ef￿cient for all
s because the gatekeeper does not exert effort e for any s = 2 S.b/ even if that would be socially
ef￿cient.) Moreover, for given P0 ￿ P.c/ for c 2
￿N b; N c
￿
that satis￿es (21), one can compute




that satis￿es (22) by the method
of successive approximations applied to the Volterra integral equation (24), see Kolmogorov
and Fomin (1975, pp.75-76). However, without further restrictions on f .cIs;b/, one cannot
guarantee that this solution will satisfy P.c/ ￿ P0 and P0.c/ ￿ 0 for all c, in which case
Proposition 5 does not apply. Of course, for different functions P0 ￿ P.c/ for c 2
￿N b; N c
￿
that




that satisfy (22) will, in general,
be different and some of these may satisfy P.c/ ￿ P0 and P0.c/ ￿ 0 for all c even if others
do not. Also, the requirement that P0.c/ ￿ 0 is a suf￿cient, not a necessary condition. All that
is actually required is that P0.c/ is suf￿ciently small that the expression in (18) evaluated in
the proof of Proposition 5 is non-negative. In some special cases, existence of a contract that




is easily demonstrated, as the following
examples show.
Example 1 : s￿.b/ D s for all b. In this case, incentive compatibility is satis￿ed as long as the
left-hand side of (20) is at least as great as the right-hand side. That condition can be satis￿ed
with P.c/ D N P for P0 ￿ N P suf￿ciently large, which certainly satis￿es P0.c/ ￿ 0 for all c.
Example 2 : f .cIs;b/ D ￿.c ￿ s/ for all .c;s;b/. In this case, knowledge of b provides no
additional information about cost given s and s is a signal that, like the mean of a normal
distribution, simply shifts the distribution. It is shown in an appendix that solutions to (19) then




. It is also shown there
that, for 8.:/ the distribution function associated with the density function ￿.:/, (20) is satis￿ed
by P.c/ D N P for all c when N P satis￿es
P0 ￿ N P D
e
￿
=[1 ￿ 8.k/] > 0; (25)
which certainly implies P.c/ ￿ P0 and P0.c/ ￿ 0 for all c.
A payment rule used in practice is the one speci￿ed in (3) making the gatekeeper residual
claimant that can be implemented by having the gatekeeper herself meet any costs resulting





cf .cIs;b/dc ￿ e; for s 2 S.b/: (26)
There are two things to note about this condition. The ￿rst is that it is independent of P0, the
payment the gatekeeper receives for seeing the patient. The second is given in the following
proposition.
16Proposition 7 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and the payment rule to gatekeepers is P.c/ D
P0 ￿ c=.1 C ￿/. Then a gatekeeper incurs effort e for no fewer signals s 2 S.b/ than is
ef￿cient.
Proof. The result follows directly from comparison of (26) with (10). The left-hand side of





bf .cIs;b/dc ￿ 0; for s 2 S.b/: (27)
Thus, for any s for which (10) is satis￿ed, (26) is satis￿ed.
This result is an example of a case in which making an agent residual claimant for cost
savings does not result in ef￿cient choice of effort. The intuition behind it is that, in deciding
whether to incur effort, the gatekeeper takes into account the reduction in cost from patients
not treated as a result of that effort, but not the bene￿t lost. Thus the incentives to incur the ad-
ditional effort are ￿too strong￿ from a social point of view. Note that the result applies whether
or not increases in s correspond to stochastically dominant distributions. The gatekeeper’s in-
centives would, of course, be aligned with social goals if the gatekeeper could be made residual
claimant for bene￿t losses as well as cost savings. To do that would require deducting the left-
hand side of (27) from the gatekeeper’s cost savings for each .s;b/. But that is not feasible
with s and b not veri￿able.
There are three main conclusions from this discussion for the use of incentive contracts
for gatekeepers. First, for patients whose expected cost of treatment resulting from referral is
less than the bene￿t (those with s 2 S.b/), it is in some cases possible to devise a payment
arrangement that induces a gatekeeper to incur effort to ￿nd out more about the cost when, and
only when, ef￿cient. Second, if instead of an optimal payment arrangement, payment takes
the form of having the gatekeeper pay for the cost of any specialist treatment resulting from
referral, the gatekeeper will incur that effort for more cost signals s 2 S.b/ than is ef￿cient
because, in deciding for which patients to incur the effort, she takes no account of the bene￿t
of treatment. Third, a gatekeeper with an incentive contract never incurs that effort for patients
whose expected cost of treatment resulting from referral is greater than the bene￿t (those with
s = 2 S.b/), whereas it is in general ef￿cient for it to be incurred for some of those patients. Thus
the actual welfare gain from using an incentive contract is less than the potential social gain
from incurring the effort to evaluate the cost of treatment resulting from referral because the
incentives of gatekeepers are not perfectly aligned with social welfare.
4 Gatekeeper chooses effort before receiving cost signal
This section turns to the case of Assumption 2 in which the gatekeeper must decide whether to
incur effort e without ￿rst observing the cost signal s and bene￿t b. In this case, if the additional
effort e is incurred, it must be incurred for all .s;b/.
17Consider ￿rst when it is socially ef￿cient for the additional effort e to be incurred. The
bene￿t b is revealed in any case. With probability ￿, the additional effort reveals the actual
cost c that would result from referral and the patient is referred if c ￿ b (whatever the signal
s). With probability 1 ￿ ￿, it reveals s but not c and the patient is referred if c.s;b/ ￿ b or,

















The social welfare gain from incurring effort e, denoted W (without arguments since it is not











db ￿ .1 C ￿/e:
(29)
The ￿rst integral term is the welfare from referring a patient who is discovered to have actual
cost less than bene￿t. The second integral term subtracts the welfare for a patient whose actual
cost is discovered and who would have been referred anyway because s 2 S.b/. For c ￿ b, this
welfare is included in the ￿rst integral. For c > b, the patient is not referred but would have
been in the absence of effort e. Both these integral terms are multiplied by the probability ￿
that actual cost is discovered. It is socially ef￿cient to incur effort e if W ￿ 0.
Now consider the incentive compatibility condition for effort e for a gatekeeper with an
incentive contract. If the gatekeeper chooses not to exert that effort, she observes s and refers











[P0 ￿ P.c/]G.S.b/Ic;b/h.c;b/dcdb: (30)
If, on the other hand, she chooses to exert effort e, she discovers with probability ￿ the actual
cost c and refers the patient if c ￿ b, whatever s would have been. With probability 1 ￿ ￿, she
does not discover the actual cost, only the signal s, refers the patient if s 2 S.b/ and receives
the expected reward in (30). For a patient not referred, she receives payment P0. Expected














db ￿ e: (31)
The incentive compatibility condition for the gatekeeper to put in effort e is that the expression
































db ￿ e ￿ U: (33)
As with Assumption 1, the incentive compatibility condition for incurring effort e differs
from the condition for that effort to be ef￿cient. The reason is again that, as is clear from
(32), the gatekeeper takes no account of the bene￿t b, whereas the condition for ef￿ciency that
W de￿ned in (29) is non-negative is affected by b. Despite that, effort can still be induced
whenever it is socially ef￿cient.
Proposition 8 SupposeAssumption2holdsanditissociallyef￿cientthatthegatekeeperincurs
effort e. Then, the welfare gain from using an incentive contract for the gatekeeper is W de￿ned
in (29).




and P.c/ D N P, with N P < P0,
for c 2 .N b; N c]. With N b < N c, the incentive compatibility condition (32) is then satis￿ed for P0￿ N P
suf￿ciently large. Changing P0 for a given difference P0 ￿ N P leaves that condition unaffected,
so P0 can be adjusted until the individual rationality condition (33) holds with equality. Then
the gatekeeper exerts effort e but receives no rent. It follows that, even for ￿ > 0, the social
welfare gain is W de￿ned in (29).
By de￿nition, W is the maximum potential social welfare gain under Assumption 2. Thus
an immediate implication of Proposition 8 is that, under Assumption 2, a shift from a gate-
keeper without an incentive contract to one with an incentive contract achieves the full social
welfare gain that can be achieved from the effort level e. Then both of the potential bene￿ts of
making the gatekeeper more cost-conscious that were discussed in the Introduction are realised.
19Moreover, this can be achieved by a simple contract with just two payment levels, the higher
level for patients not referred or referred with cost below a speci￿ed threshold, the lower one
for patients referred with cost above that threshold. This contrasts with the case of Assumption
1 for which an incentive contract can, at best, induce a gatekeeper to incur ef￿cient effort only
for s 2 S .b/ for each b. The ef￿ciency result under Assumption 2 should not, however, be
overemphasised. It would no longer hold in the more realistic case of continuous effort and ￿
an increasing function of effort. Then, because the gatekeeper ignores the bene￿t of treatment,
the level of effort that maximises the gatekeeper’s expected utility is different from that which
maximises the social welfare gain.
The full welfare gain is not, however, necessarily achieved by the payment function P.c/ D
P0 ￿ c=.1 C ￿/ given in (3) by which the gatekeeper is residual claimant for cost savings. In












db ￿ e ￿ 0: (34)
Unlike with Assumption 1, it is not necessarily the case that the private gain to the gatekeeper
from additional effort, given by the left-hand side of (34), is greater than the social gain, given
by (29). The reason is that, although the gatekeeper does not take account of bene￿t lost by
a patient not referred as the result of additional effort, she also does not take account of the
off-setting bene￿t gained by a patient who would not have been referred without the additional
effort. Either can dominate. To see this, recall that it is socially ef￿cient to incur effort e
if and only if W de￿ned in (29) is non-negative or, equivalently since ￿ ￿ 0, if and only if













Suppose the bene￿t is the same for all types, so b D N b. Then it is clear that the sign of this
expression depends on the precise characteristics of the distributions h.:/ and G.:/.
Even though use of incentives can increase social welfare, patients will not necessarily
choose to visit a gatekeeper with an incentive contract given the choice. With b > 0, the
patient wants to maximise the probability of being referred and will prefer a gatekeeper with an
incentive contract only if that probability is higher. A gatekeeper without an incentive contract
refers the patient if the expected cost of the resulting treatment given the cost signal is less than
the bene￿t, that is, if s 2 S.b/. For a patient who does not know his own type, the probability






A gatekeeper with an incentive contract who incurs effort e refers the patient if she learns the
20actual cost c and c ￿ b, or if she learns only the signal s and s 2 S.b/. For a patient who does
not know his own type, the probability assessment of being referred by a gatekeeper with an

























This may be positive or negative. Whichever it is, there is no reason for its sign to be the same
as that of the expression on the left-hand side of (29) that measures the social welfare gain.
This analysis, however, presumes that patients do not have information about the expected
cost and bene￿t resulting from referral before they choose whether to visit a gatekeeper with
an incentive contract. When they do, the following result applies.
Proposition 9 Suppose Assumption 2 holds and all patients observe their own .s;b/ before
choosing whether to visit a gatekeeper with an incentive contract. Then a gatekeeper with an
incentive contract does not incur the additional effort e.
Proof. Suppose, contrary to the claim, that it is incentive compatible for a gatekeeper with
an incentive contract to choose effort e. Patients who observe their own .s;b/ before choosing
which gatekeeper to visit choose a gatekeeper without an incentive contract if c.s;b/ ￿ b
and there exists some c > b for which P.c/ < P0 and f .cIs;b/ > 0 because that gatekeeper
will certainly refer them, whereas there is strictly positive probability that a gatekeeper exerting
effort e will not. Those with c.s;b/ > b choose a gatekeeper with an incentive contract because
one without will certainly not refer them, whereas there is strictly positive probability that a
gatekeeper incurring effort e will discover they have actual cost c ￿ b and so refer them. But
thenapatientchoosingagatekeeperwithanincentivecontracthass 2 S.b/onlyif f .cIs;b/ D
0 for all c > b for which P.c/ < P0. That corresponds to the ￿rst integral in the square brackets
in the gatekeeper’s incentive compatibility condition (32) being zero, so that condition cannot
be satis￿ed.
The essential point here is that, if a gatekeeper with an incentive contract knows that all the
patients who attend do so because they know they will not be referred by a gatekeeper without
an incentive contract, then she has no incentive to put in effort to ￿nd out the cost resulting
from referral. She knows that, without effort e, the evidence she will acquire will justify not
referring the patient, so there can be no gain from the additional effort.
Assuming that patients know in advance exactly what a gatekeeper without an incentive
contract will discover is clearly an extreme case. But it is certainly not unreasonable to suppose
21that patients who can, as here, gain by ￿nding out information about their type before choosing
a gatekeeper will go to some trouble to do so. And if those who are likely to bene￿t from
choosing a gatekeeper without an incentive contract actually do that, they reduce the incentive
forgatekeeperswithincentivecontractstoincureffortto￿ndoutabouttheactualcostsresulting
from referral. The continued viability of incentive contracts thus depends on patient ignorance
under circumstances in which patients have good reason not to remain ignorant.
5 Evidence and implications
A valuable source of empirical evidence on the effects of incentive contracts for gatekeepers on
referrals comes from the experiment with GP fundholding in the publicly-funded British NHS.
Non-fundholding GPs are paid a capitation fee for each patient on their list.7 Patients they
refer have their treatment costs met by a local health authority. These GPs are thus gatekeep-
ers without an incentive contract. The model used here predicts that, in both scenarios, such
gatekeepers refer a patient only if b ￿ c.s;b/ whereas, without a gatekeeper, any patient with
b > 0 would see a specialist. That is consistent with the widely-held view that the traditional
GP arrangement reduces the usage of such services. See Gerdtham and J￿nsson (2000, p.46)
for a summary of cross-country empirical results on the effect of gatekeepers.
Fundholding GPs received, in addition to the capitation fee, an allowance from which they
were to meet the treatment costs of patients they referred for a range of (non-emergency) ser-
vices up to a maximum for each patient in each year, with any excess being met by the health
authority. For services in that range, they were paying gatekeepers with net reward given by
the expression in (3) for c up to the speci￿ed maximum. The power of that reward system
was, however, restricted because fundholders were not permitted to take any excess of their
allowance over costs as additional personal income though, since they were allowed to use it
for extra staff and for improvements to premises, they could personally gain indirectly from it.
That reduced the effective reward from reducing referral costs and was thus like increasing the
slope of the reward so that P0.c/ > ￿1=.1 C ￿/.
Some researchers have questioned whether referral rates for fundholders were different
from those for non-fundholders, see Coulter and Bradlow (1993). That is consistent with the
scenario of Assumption 2 because the difference in the probability of referral given in (38) may
be either positive or negative. It would be consistent with the scenario of Assumption 1 only
if the signal s revealed an upper bound on the cost resulting from referral so that a gatekeeper
with an incentive contract refers all patient who would be referred by one without. An example
wouldbewhenthegatekeepercaneasilyestablishthestandardcostatthelocalhospitalbutmay
be able to achieve a lower cost by searching or bargaining. The formal model can be adapted
to this example by de￿ning c.s;b/ as the known cost in the absence of further investigation,
so f .cIs;b/ D 0 for c > c.s;b/. However, the weight of the empirical evidence surveyed by
7Gravelle (1999) studies some implications of capitation contracts but not for referrals or fundholding.
22O’Donnell (2000) is that referral rates were lower for fundholders than for non-fundholders, as
implied by the scenario of Assumption 1.
Patients could choose between a fundholding and a non-fundholding GP, though the former
were not available in all geographical areas. In contrast to the results in Propositions 3 and 4
for the case of Assumption 1, many patients chose fundholder GPs, though it may have been
that they simply continued to use the same GP when that GP became a fundholder. This would
suggest that the scenario of Assumption 2 may have been more appropriate. There are, how-
ever, reasons to think that such a conclusion is premature because there were other aspects of
the British system that made it attractive to be on the list of a fundholding GP but that were
not inherent to gatekeeping with incentive contracts. First, the contracts used by health author-
ities to pay providers of specialist services for treating patients of non-fundholders did not, in
many cases, involve any extra direct payment for treating an additional patient. In contrast,
fundholders typically paid directly for each patient treated. Thus, not surprisingly, providers
gave priority to the patients of fundholders who therefore had shorter waiting times for many
treatments, see Propper, Croxson and Shearer (2002). Formally, that corresponds to the bene￿t
b being higher for the patients of fundholding GPs. But this was the result of inappropriate
contractual arrangements between health authorities and providers of specialist services for pa-
tients of non-fundholders, not something inherent to fundholding, so the comparison does not
correspond to that made here. Second, fundholders had an incentive to treat patients at their
own practice if that was cheaper than referring them to a specialist, whereas non-fundholders
did not. Many fundholders did in fact provide more treatments themselves, which may have
been more convenient for patients. That is a potential welfare gain not accounted for in the
model but again not necessarily inherent to fundholding. When it comes to other aspects of ser-
vices, a survey carried out by the Consumers Association (1995, p.16), concluded: ￿Patients of
fundholders are less satis￿ed with aspects of their GP service than patients of non-fundholders.￿
That is consistent with the results for Assumption 1.
A number of practical considerations arise from the analysis. Proposition 6 speci￿es con-
ditions for a payment rule that, under Assumption 1, ensure ef￿cient effort for all patients for
whom the initial cost signal indicates an expected cost less than the bene￿t. There are two
complications with using such a payment rule in practice. First, the precise rule depends cru-
cially on the distribution f .cIs;b/. This means that it will typically have to be speci￿c to
each medical condition. That could be an administrative nightmare. Second, an optimal rule
depends on monitoring the actual cost of treatment which is, at least in some cases, unlikely to
be costless as assumed in the model. The payment rule speci￿ed in (3) making the gatekeeper
residual claimant (a paying gatekeeper) is both independent of the medical condition and avoids
the need for monitoring cost because it can be implemented simply by having the gatekeeper
meet any costs of treatment herself. As noted above, that rule corresponds to the reward to an
HMO that both provides full insurance (without co-payments) and also acts as the gatekeeper
because the HMO then receives the insurance premium (which corresponds to P0) and must
pay the costs of any treatment that is authorised. It also corresponds to the scheme used for
23lower levels of expenditure on referrals by GP fundholders in the British NHS.
For that rule, Proposition 7 showed that, under Assumption 1, a gatekeeper incurs effort
e for more signals s 2 S.b/ than would be socially ef￿cient. Moreover, when the effort is
incurred, some patients are not referred because the cost is discovered to exceed the bene￿t.
Thus, the gatekeeper refers fewer types s than is socially ef￿cient. In this situation, restrictions
such as those on how fundholders in the British NHS could spend cost savings may prove
useful. Such restrictions reduce the value of cost savings below that of unrestricted cash, so
they have the effect of multiplying the left-hand side of Eq.(17) by a factor less than one and
thus make the incentives of the fundholder to incur effort closer to what is socially ef￿cient.
This result also has implications for the structure of private health insurance. Suppose
insurance is provided by an HMO that also acts as gatekeeper. If patients are required to make
co-payments that result in the net reward to the HMO satisfying the conditions of Proposition
6, gatekeeping effort will be ef￿cient for all signals s for which b ￿ c.s;b/. But co-payments
are a second-best solution that detract from ef￿cient insurance. However, the same effect can
be achieved without co-payments by separating the insurance function from the gatekeeping
function, with the insurance premium paid to a separate insurance company that subcontracts
the gatekeeping function to a third party using an optimal payment rule.
With Assumption 1, as Proposition 3 showed, a gatekeeper with an incentive contract incurs
additional effort only for a patient who would be treated by a gatekeeper without an incentive
contract, so a patient’s probability of being treated is never higher from going to a gatekeeper
withanincentivecontract. Thusnopatientpreferstouseagatekeeperwithanincentivecontract
toonewithout. ByProposition4, anyforwhomtherearesocialgainstousingagatekeeperwith
an incentive contract actively prefer one without. So patients who do not know their own type
always prefer a gatekeeper without an incentive contract. Giving them the choice between a
gatekeeper with an incentive contract and one without will thus destroy the potential advantages
of using incentive contracts. With the scenario of Assumption 2, that is no longer the case.
As Proposition 9 showed, however, it remains the case that, if patients learn suf￿cient about
their types for those likely to bene￿t from choosing a gatekeeper without an incentive contract
to do so, the effectiveness of offering a choice between gatekeepers with different contracts
breaks down. Thus, in neither case is it likely to be satisfactory to introduce gatekeepers with
incentive contracts alongside those without and let patients choose between them, as in the
fundholdingarrangementsintheBritishNHS.Gatekeepingwithincentivecontractsunderthese
circumstances is an ￿all or nothing￿ system.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has analysed some implications of gatekeeper arrangements for controlling access
to specialist medical services. It has explored two scenarios. In both scenarios, a gatekeeper
without an incentive contract receives a signal of the cost and bene￿t of referring a patient and
uses this information to decide whether to do so. Also in both scenarios, it may be worthwhile
24for a gatekeeper with an incentive contract to ￿nd out more about the cost before deciding
whether to refer the patient. In the ￿rst scenario, the gatekeeper decides on the level of investi-
gation after observing the initial signal of cost and bene￿t. In the second, that decision must be
made before receiving any signal of cost or bene￿t.
Using incentive contracts for gatekeepers may or may not be socially worthwhile. Whether
it is depends on the distribution of treatment costs and on the disutility associated with ￿nding
out further information about those costs. But two general messages come across clearly. First,
in the ￿rst scenario, the arrangement by which the gatekeeper receives a ￿xed fee and must pay
for the cost of treatment herself, as with HMOs that act as both full insurer and gatekeeper and
with fundholding GPs in Britain, results in too strong incentives when expected cost based on
the initial signal is less than the bene￿t. As a result, fewer patient types are referred than would
be the case with ef￿cient incentives. This contrasts with other agency problems in which mak-
ing the agent residual claimant for costs ensures ef￿cient decisions. This result has implications
for the contractual arrangements for gatekeepers. It also has implications for the organisation of
private health insurance. More ef￿cient than having an HMO itself act as both gatekeeper and
insurer is for insurance to be with a third party insurer who employs the HMO on a contractual
basis that does not make the HMO residual claimant.
Second, it is not sensible to introduce incentive contracts for just some gatekeepers when
patients have a choice between types of gatekeeper, as in the fundholding system in the British
NHS. In the ￿rst scenario studied here, patients for whom there are potential social bene￿ts
from using a gatekeeper with an incentive contract always prefer one without. In the second,
there are forces at work that should, with time, reduce the effectiveness of gatekeeper incen-
tives. This implication of using incentive contracts may have been masked in the British NHS
because there were other factors present not inherent to fundholding that made attending a
fundholder attractive. But it is one that, in general, it would be unwise to ignore.
Appendix
Derivations for Example 2. For f .cIs;b/ D ￿.c ￿ s/ for all .c;s;b/ and s￿.b/ strictly
















































25for some function 9.:/ and 8.:/ the distribution function associated with the density function
￿.:/. It is clear from (A.2) that solutions s￿.b/ to (A.1) for different values of b all take the
form b ￿ s￿.b/ equal to a constant. There may be multiple solutions of this form but, since
s￿.b/ is de￿ned as the lowest s that satis￿es (A.1), the relevant solution for all b is always that
for which b ￿s￿.b/ takes the largest value. Let k denote the corresponding value of b ￿s￿.b/
and note that k < N c because otherwise the expression in (A.2) would be zero. Now suppose
P.c/ D N P, for all c. Then the left-hand side of (20), the condition that ensures incentive































P0 ￿ N P
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[1 ￿ 8.k/]:




by a value of N P that satis￿es (25).
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